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1. International environment 
The September 11th attacks on the United States and the consequent combat against 
international terrorism have clouded the short-term outlook for the world economy. World 
economic growth had already slowed considerably from the final quarter of last year. This 
was in part the consequence of past  monetary tightening in reaction to persistently high 
growth rates in the US and the impact of rising energy prices. A major impetus, however, 
came from the bursting of the high-tech investment bubble, accompanied by a marked fall in 
equity prices, generating a sudden world-wide decline in confidence. Leading indicators in 
late summer suggested that the bottom of the cycle might have been near, at least for the 
United States, although the accumulation of debt by the private sector  and the related large 
current account deficit remained a serious risk to growth. The attacks of September 11 have 
altered this picture drastically. A further deepening of the international cyclical downturn in 
the remaining part of the year now seems unavoidable, while the previously expected 
recovery of the international economy will be delayed by at least one to two quarters into 
early 2002. 
Recent movements in leading indicators for OECD production and recent confidence 
indicators strengthen the  belief that recovery will be delayed. US consumer confidence in 
October dropped to its lowest level in more than seven years, and the purchasing managers 
index for industry fell to its lowest level since February 1991. Unemployment has risen 
sharply, to 5.4 per cent in October. The US economy is clearly in recession at the present 
time. Japan is in an even more serious situation. Output and  prices are both is falling, the 
public deficit is extremely high and the financial sector is burdened by bad loans.  
Inflation in the industrial world is clearly receding, partly due to falling oil and other 
commodity prices on the world market  due to weakening demand. The price of Brent oil fell 
to below $20 per barrel in early November, down from $27 just two months earlier, while 
other commodity prices have dropped to their lowest levels since the early 1970s. 
The direct economic effects of the attacks in terms of destruction and disruption of activity 
are rather limited and confined to specific sectors like aviation, transport and tourism. Much 
more damaging is the worldwide loss of confidence due to increased uncertainty, causing 
expenditure decisions to be delayed. Consumers will tend to save more, and investments will 
be postponed, including investment in the emerging economies. This will depress demand not 
just in the United States, but all over the world, partly through spillover effects.  
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The timing of the recovery, and the extent to which expenditure weakens, partly depend on 
future developments in the battle against terrorism. Uncertainties surrounding this outlook are 
high. Our projection starts from the assumption that possible further attacks will not have 
major negative effects on sentiment, and that oil supplies from the Middle East will not be 
disrupted. Under these conditions, confidence could rebuild gradually, and policy incentives 
could do their work and foster a solid recovery particularly in the second half of 2002. 
Policy reactions  
Economic policy in the industrial world responded rapidly to the terrorist attacks, particularly 
in the United States. In a co-ordinated action, central banks in the major industrial countries 
reduced their lending rates, and injected large amounts of liquidity into their economies. The 
US Federal Reserve System had already reduced its official rates repeatedly this year in 
reaction to slowing activity and better inflation prospects. Since the start of this year short-
term rates have been cut by 4½ percentage points, bringing the federal funds target rate to a 
record low of 2% in November. The rate could be raised again in the second half of next year 
if the economy strengthens as expected. Long-term rates have fallen slightly since September 
11th, reflecting lower short rates, weaker cyclical prospects and lower inflation expectations. 
The Bank of Japan has no room for manoeuvre as its short-term rates are already close to 
zero, where they are likely to remain next year. 
Chart 1 Real GDP-growth United States and Japan, 1998-2002 
  (quarter to quarter change at annual rate) 
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Fiscal policy has been eased, notably in the United States. Federal expenditure has been  
raised by at least $55 billion, of which $20 billion will be used to rebuild Manhattan, $15 
billion to support the airline industry and the remaining $20 billion for military expenses and 
airport security. In addition, the Bush administration has announced a further economic 
programme of $60 billion to stimulate the economy, mainly consisting of tax cuts (although 
this is still in discussion in Congress). In Japan the government has limited room for 
manoeuvre. The government is preparing a package for structural reform, aimed in part at 
consolidation of the ailing banking sector, which may depress activity in the short term but 
which should aid prospects in the medium term. In Europe we anticipate that most 
governments will let automatic stabilisers do their work, and accept a deterioration of the 
government balance.  
Prospects 
Table 1 shows the expected economic growth in the major regions. According to our 
forecasts, the cycle will bottom out early next year, supported by strong monetary and fiscal 
responses. In particular, the United States recovery could be strong. But the Japanese 
economy is expected to remain sluggish, with structural reforms by the government having a 
negative impact on short-term domestic demand. The impulse from net exports could support 
activity to some extent, particularly if demand in Asia picks up with the expected reversal of 
the ICT downturn. 
Table 1. International developments  
(annual percentage changes) 
 1990-97 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real GDP: World  3.0  2.8  3.6  4.7  2.0  2.2 
                  European Union    2.0  2.8  2.6  3.4  1.7  1.8 
                  Non-EU world  3.2  2.8  3.8  4.9  2.3  2.3 
                  United States  2.7  4.3  4.1  4.1  1.0  1.0 
                  Japan  2.2 -1.1  0.8  1.5 -0.7 -0.5 
                  Non-Japan Asia  8.3  4.7  6.6  7.0  4.7  4.6 
                  Central and Eastern Europe -5.0 -0.8  3.6  6.3  2.5  2.2 
                 Other developing countries  3.7  0.7  0.9  3.9  2.1  2.0 
World trade volume (goods)  6.7  5.5  6.2 12.9  0.3  2.3 
World price manufactured goods ($)  1.1 -1.4 -1.7 -5.4 -1.4  2.4 
Consumer prices:  United States  3.3  1.5  2.2  3.4  2.9  1.4 
                              Japan  1.5  0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.4 
Note: regional aggregates using PPP-weights. 
Inflation in the industrial world is expected to remain subdued next year. Low capacity 
utilisation and increased unemployment will help to keep domestic wage and price 
developments in check, although the firming of activity could lead to some price pressures in 
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the course of next year. Commodity prices could recover somewhat during the course of 
next year, but the year-on-year percentage change will remain negative. The demand for oil is 
much lower than earlier envisaged, partly due to the problems in the aviation industry. OPEC 
is not likely to reduce its production significantly, as it does not want to lose market share to 
non-OPEC competitors. In this situation oil prices are expected to remain at the lower end of 
the OPEC price band. Profits as well as household disposable incomes should benefit from 
low inflation in most of the industrial countries. 
 
Table 2. Key economic assumptions  
                                             Interest rates (%)                          Exchange rates    Oil prices 
                            Short-term                         Long-term              (per euro)       ($ per barrel)  
                  ___________________      __________________   __________ 
                    US        Euro      UK           US       Euro      UK       US        UK 
                                 area                                     area  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
1998            5.5        3.9        7.3             5.3        4.7        5.5      1.11        0.67       12.4 
1999            5.3        3.0        5.4             5.6        4.6        5.1      1.07        0.66       17.3 
2000            6.5        4.4        6.1             6.0        5.4        5.3      0.92        0.61       27.1 
2001            3.8        4.3        5.1             5.0        5.0        4.9      0.90        0.62       23.7 
2002            2.7        3.3        4.9             4.9        4.8        5.0      0.95        0.67       21.0 
 
Notes: Short-term interest rates are 3 month money market rates. Long-term rates are the yields on 10 year 
government bonds. Oil prices are a weighted average of Dubai and Brent spot prices. 
 
International trade 
The growth of world trade volumes had already slowed sharply before the September 11 
attack, and these events will weaken trade prospects further. The weakening has been 
particularly marked in the United States, Japan and other Asia (excluding China). Trade 
growth this year is projected at close to zero, which is the weakest performance since 1982. 
World trade is expected to rebound in the course of next year, but the negative carry-over 
from this year will keep the projected average growth rate at less than 2½ per cent in 2002. 
Even this figure implies strong growth of close to 10 per cent during the year to the fourth 
quarter. Import growth is expected to pick-up strongly in the US and a number of South-East 
Asian countries. European imports could pick up somewhat later and at a slower pace. 
Japanese imports will probably remain weak next year. 
Risks 
The projection includes considerable upward and downward risks. When the world economy 
is near a cyclical low, projections can easily over or undershoot. The slowdown can prevail 
longer, but there is also the possibility of a stronger and quicker rebound given the substantial 
  
7
policy incentives. Downward risks can be large if uncertainty persists and/or in case of new 
adverse events. This could keep confidence low for a much longer time than in our 
projection. Households could defer spending for longer and save more. Investment could 
resume later, due to weaker profit expectations and equity prices. Thus domestic demand 
could slow even more than in our main forecast. Imports in the non-industrial world could 
also be adversely affected by  financing problems, if foreign investors become more risk-
averse. Oil prices could rise again as a consequence of (politically motivated) supply 
disruptions. Finally, the dollar could weaken substantially in response to the unsustainable 
US external position.  
The major downside risk we foresee is that consumption in the US is significantly weaker 
than we currently anticipate. If it is, US and European GDP growth would be well below that 
suggested in our forecast. We have simulated weaker consumption using the NiGEM model, 
which is the framework within which we have produced our forecast. We have assumed that 
the US savings ratio rises by 2 percentage points to around 5 percent by the end of 2002. This 
would imply that US GDP would continue to shrink by 0.5 per cent a quarter or more in 
2001q4 to 2002q2, giving four successive quarters of negative growth despite a strong 
reaction from the Federal Reserve. Our model-based interest rate reaction suggests that US 
interest rates would be cut by 50 basis points once the authorities became clear that this 
scenario was developing, and that further cuts would follow. The contagion from such a 
decline in US output would be hard to contain, and we would anticipate that the level of 
output in the Euro Area would be half a per cent lower by the end of 2002 than in our main 
forecast despite a robust initial reaction from the ECB. Our model-based reaction function 
suggests European interest rates would also be cut by half a percentage point, but the euro 
might strengthen against the dollar by around 5 per cent, partly offsetting the expansionary 
effects of the interest rate cut.  
Longer-term economic effects of 11th September. 
 
The effects of the terrorist attacks on world activity can manifest themselves over a longer 
period. Structural growth could be depressed for some time. Non-productive costs have risen, 
e.g. costs of security and transportation, higher insurance and higher risk premiums. Over the 
medium term one can expect a shift towards (generally less productive) investment aimed at 
reducing such costs. The increased preference of investors for domestic equities and bonds 
reduces the diversification of investment portfolios, enlarging the so-called non-systemic risk. 
Internationalisation trends, often considered as the driving force of the world economy, could 
slow under continued terrorist threats. Patters of demand could change as well in reaction to 
the attacks. For instance, travel could be substituted by electronic communication, air travel 
by rail and road transportation, while investments in security could boom. Also inventory 
formation could change, as companies want to hold higher stock levels as a precaution 
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against possible supply disruptions, from just-in-time to just-in-case. All of these factors 
may reduce growth in the short term as adjustment takes place. 
The ICT sector and American growth 
 
The slowdown in US growth since 2000 was mainly driven by the collapse of ICT demand 
which had been strong because of Y2K investments, the growth of the internet and related 
developments in financial markets. The ICT sector’s strong growth represented a technology 
shock, but the evidence of a strong impact of ICT use on productivity growth outside the ICT 
sector is mixed (see 1, 2 and 3). The growing size of the ICT sector and the use of ICT have 
obviously raised the efficiency of the American economy by increasing total factor 
productivity growth from less than 0.5 per cent per year in 1974-95 to around one per cent in 
the latter part of nineties. As a result, the potential growth rate may have risen by around 0.5 
per cent to 3-3.5 per cent (see 3).  
It will take some time to reduce existing overcapacity in the sector. In the first half of this 
year, shipments of computers and communication equipment dropped by 10 to 20 per cent 
compared to the latter half of 2000 (see 4). There is still no sign of a recovery, but a turn-
around in ICT demand is expected to take place in tandem with the general cyclical upturn. 
Increased demand for security investment due to terrorist threats, the ageing of ICT products 
and lower prices because of excess capacity will contribute to the sector’s recovery by the 
end of 2002. E-business activity will go on maturing, finally generating some of the promised 
productivity gains. The ICT diffusion process is at its beginning, and the creative use of ICT 
products, not their production, may become the key to growth acceleration (see 5). 
Europe is expected to follow the US recovery in ICT, with the exception of wireless 
technology, where some positive developments are already visible in the mobile phone sector 
in spite of the UMTS problems inside the EU for instance in Finland. 
1.  Gordon R.: Does the ”New Economy” Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past? 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4, fall 2000.  
2. Jalava, J., Pohjola, M.: Economic Growth in the New Economy. Evidence from Advanced 
Economies. WIDER DP No. 2001/5. 
3. Onliner, S. D., Sichel, D.E.: The Resurgence of Growth in the late 1990’s: Is Information 
Technology a Story? Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, 2000. 
4. Temkin, Bruce D.: Tech Recovery in 2003: A different Beast¨. The Forrester Brief. 
(http://www.forrester.com/ER/Research/Brief/0,1317,13717,00.html) 
5. McGuckin, R., van Ark, B.: “Making the Most of the Information Age : Productivity and 
Structural Reform in the New Economy”, Conference Board, October 2001. 
(http://www.conference-board.org/search/dpress.cfm?pressid=4669) 
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2. Euro Area Recovery Postponed 
After having peaked in the second quarter of 2000, economic growth in the Euro Area 
continued to slow in the course of 2001 and almost came to a halt in the summer. At the same 
time the unemployment rate, which had been on a downward trend since 1997, has stopped 
falling.  This is the third major slow down in growth since the recession in 1992/93. In 1995 
and 1998 the deterioration in GDP growth was mainly due to weakening external demand. 
The downturn in the international business cycle and the sudden end of exceptionally rapid 
growth in the ICT sector have also adversely affected external demand this year, but there are 
also signs that domestic demand has slowed considerably as well.  Rising energy prices had a 
negative effect on domestic disposable incomes in the first half of 2001 and a jump in food 
prices generated by animal diseases in the agricultural sector further eroded households 
purchasing power. The effects of the rise in key interest rates in the course of 2000 also began 
to be felt. All these factors have dampened economic activity this year, more than offsetting 
the positive impact coming from the tax cuts that were implemented at the beginning of 2001 
in a number of countries. 
The economic situation had already deteriorated by more than had been generally expected 
before September 11. However signs of stabilisation did emerge in August in some 
components of industrial surveys and industrial production did not fall further on average in 
July and August. This apparent improvement in the economic climate reflected both hopes 
that the slowdown in the world economy was about to bottom out and also the fact that the 
dampening impact of higher prices had started to fade as inflation began to decline. 
Chart 4. Quarterly GDP growth in Euro Area (%, quarterly rate)
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The short-term outlook has clearly deteriorated since September 11, as can already be seen 
from recent qualitative indictors (see charts 3-4). A deterioration of the outlook in the 
immediate future is also indicated by the latest results of the Euroframe/FTD-Indicator. The 
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Euro Area economy will be adversely affected through three different channels. First, 
exports will be hit as US import demand falters and the economic slowdown deepens world-
wide, reducing demand from other countries as well. Second, uncertainty in financial markets 
has risen. European stock markets, which had already weakened considerably over the spring 
and summer, fell further in the aftermath of the attacks, although much of the immediate fall 
has subsequently been recovered. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the resulting loss 
of confidence of European investors and consumers will dampen domestic demand. As a 
consequence the previously anticipated recovery of European growth towards more normal 
levels will be delayed into next year. Our central forecast suggests that the Euro Area will 
avoid falling into outright recession, although we recognise that there is still a risk that it 
might do so. However, prior to September the economy was in a less vulnerable cyclical 
position than the US, and there are likely to be smaller negative effects on transportation, 
tourism and entertainment industries in Europe than in the US.  
Euro Area GDP is forecast to grow by 1.6 per cent this year, almost 2 percentage points less 
than in 2000 (see table 3). The positive contribution of the external sector to growth, which 
amounted to 0.6 percentage points last year, will almost vanish with export growth slowing 
more rapidly than import growth. Private consumption is expected to hold up relatively well 
due to healthy increases of real disposable income. Investment growth has slowed 
significantly, reflecting diminished expectations for profits and sales brought about by the 
world economic slowdown, the rise in interest rates last year and the decline in the terms of 
trade. The slow down in growth is most pronounced in Finland and Ireland (see table 4), 
which are particularly exposed to the global ICT downturn, and in Germany, mainly due to a 
specific weakness in the construction sector.  
Inflation will continue to moderate in the remaining months of this year due to continued 
declines in energy and food prices. Nevertheless, annual inflation as measured by the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is expected to average 2.7 per cent, ranging 
from 5 per cent in the Netherlands to 2 per cent in France (see table 5). Labour market 
conditions will start to slacken, reflecting the emergence of a negative output gap. However, 
the unemployment rate, at 8.4 per cent, will still be 0.5 percentage points lower this year than 
the year before. 
For 2002, we expect a gradual recovery in output growth in the Euro Area. Investor and 
consumer sentiment are expected to gradually recover as the immediate impact of the recent 
events starts to fade. This will help demand to pick up in the first half of next year, with the 
quarterly growth rate accelerating to just under 3 per cent at an annualised rate by the end of 
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the year. Nevertheless, the minimal carry-over from 2001 will keep the annual GDP 
growth rate projected for 2002 at the same level as this year at 1.6 per cent. Global monetary 
easing and fiscal stimuli (particularly in the US) will increasingly be felt, and with the world 
economy on an increasingly firm recovery track export growth will pick-up and corporate 
investment will strengthen. The recovery will, however, in all likelihood not be strong 
enough to prevent a rise in the number of unemployed. The unemployment rate is expected to 
average 8.7 per cent next year, some 0.3 percentage points higher than this year.  
Consumer price inflation is expected to be subdued next year, with the annual inflation rate 
averaging 1.5 per cent, well within the target band of the ECB. Price pressures should be 
reduced by lower prices of raw materials including oil, the weaker dollar and the 
normalisation of food prices. In addition, in some countries, most notably the Netherlands, 
increases in indirect taxation at the beginning of 2001 will drop out of the annual inflation 
rate. The lower level of inflation will help support real incomes and household expenditures. 
Risks 
The risks to our forecast come mainly from the international environment. On the domestic 
side, the main risk is that uncertainty about economic prospects reduces the propensity to 
consume and to invest by more, or for longer, than expected. The current Euroframe-FTD 
indicator for the first quarter of 2002 indicates that this risk should not be neglected, 
particularly if business and household sentiment do not recover from depressed figures in 
October. In this event GDP growth could be easily closer to 1 per cent next year and it is 
possible that a recession – as defined by two quarters of consecutive negative growth – could 
occur. Domestic demand would also be hit if governments fail to allow automatic fiscal 
stabilisers to work. 
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Table 3. The Euro Area 
(percentage change unless otherwise stated) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP at constant prices  2.6  3.4  1.6  1.6 
Private Consumption  3.2  2.6  1.9  2.0 
Government Expenditure  2.4  1.9  1.6  1.5 
Private Investment  5.5  4.8  1.3  3.9 
Stockbuilding (chg as % of GDP) -0.2  0.0 -0.2  0.2 
Domestic Demand  3.2  2.9  1.5  2.4 
Exports (goods and services)  5.1 11.9  3.5  2.9 
Imports (goods and services)  7.0 10.7  3.2  4.9 
Unemployment Rate (%) 10.0  8.9  8.4  8.7 
Average Earnings  2.1  3.4  2.9  3.2 
Harmonised Consumer Price Index  1.1  2.4  2.7  1.5 
Household Real Disposable Income  2.4  2.2  2.2  2.9 
General Govt. Balance (% of GDP) -1.3  0.8 -1.1 -1.1 
General Govt. Gross Debt (% of GDP) 72.1 69.6 68.2 66.6 
Note: The general government balance numbers include the receipts from the sale of UTMS licences.
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Table 4. GDP Growth (% per annum) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Austria 2.8 3.4 1.3 1.5 
Belgium 2.7 4.0 1.8 1.5 
Finland 4.0 5.7 1.0 2.0 
France 3.0 3.4 2.0 1.8 
Germany 1.7 3.2 0.8 1.3 
Greece 3.4 4.1 3.6 2.8 
Ireland 9.8 11.0 7.0 3.5 
Italy 1.6 2.9 1.8 1.4 
Netherlands 3.7 3.5 1.6 1.5 
Portugal 3.3 3.3 1.9 1.9 
Spain 4.1 4.1 2.4 2.0 
     
Euro Area 2.6 3.4 1.6 1.6 
     
Denmark 2.1 3.2 1.1 1.9 
Sweden 3.9 3.5 1.8 1.5 
UK 2.1 2.9 2.3 2.3 
     
European Union 2.6 3.4 1.7 1.8 
 
Table 5. Harmonised Consumer Price Inflation (% per annum) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Austria 0.5 2.0 2.6 1.7 
Belgium 1.1 2.6 2.5 1.9 
Finland 1.3 3.0 2.8 1.5 
France 0.6 1.8 2.0 1.3 
Germany 0.6 2.1 2.6 1.3 
Greece 2.2 2.9 3.6 3.3 
Ireland 2.5 5.2 3.9 2.2 
Italy 1.6 2.6 2.6 1.6 
Netherlands 2.0 2.4 5.0 2.2 
Portugal 2.1 2.8 4.3 2.3 
Spain 2.3 3.5 3.6 2.0 
     
Euro Area 1.1 2.4 2.7 1.5 
     
Denmark 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.0 
Sweden 0.6 1.3 2.6 1.4 
UK 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.2 
     
European Union 1.2 2.1 2.5 1.6 
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Table 6. Standardised Unemployment Rates (% ) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Austria 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.9 
Belgium 8.8 7.0 6.8 7.0 
Finland 10.2 9.7 9.1 9.2 
France 11.2 9.5 8.6 8.8 
Germany 8.6 7.9 7.9 8.3 
Greece 12.0 11.3 11.2 11.1 
Ireland 5.6 4.2 3.8 3.9 
Italy 11.4 10.5 9.5 9.8 
Netherlands 3.3 2.8 2.3 2.7 
Portugal 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.5 
Spain 15.9 14.1 13.1 13.0 
     
Euro Area 10.0 8.9 8.4 8.7 
     
Denmark 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 
Sweden 7.2 5.9 5.1 5.3 
UK 6.0 5.5 5.0 5.3 
     
European Union 9.1 8.2 7.7 7.9 
 
Table 7. General Government Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) 
 
 1999    2000   2001 2002 
Austria -2.2   -1.1   -0.8 -0.4 
Belgium -0.6     0.1     0.3 (0.2)  0.1 
Finland  1.9     6.8     4.5  3.0 
France -1.6   -1.3 -1.3 (-1.4) -1.7 
Germany -1.6     1.2 (-1.3)   -2.5 -1.9 
Greece -1.8   -1.1   -0.2  0.2 
Ireland  2.3     4.6    3.1  2.5 
Italy -1.8   -0.3 (-1.5)   -1.3 -1.1 
Netherlands  0.4     2.2  (1.5)     1.2  0.6 
Portugal -2.2 -1.5 (-1.8)   -1.4 -1.5 
Spain -1.1   -0.3 (-0.4)   -0.2 -0.2 
     
Euro Area -1.3     0.3 (-0.8)   -1.1 -1.1 
     
Denmark  3.1     2.8    2.2  1.7 
Sweden  1.8     4.1    4.5  2.1 
UK  1.3     4.3  (1.9)    1.1 -0.3 
     
European Union -0.7     1.2 (-0.1)   -0.7 -0.9 
Note: Inclusive of receipts from the sale of UTMS licences. Figures excluding UTMS revenues shown in 
parentheses. 
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Chart 3. Euro Area: Industry Indicators
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 Chart 4  Euro Area: Confidence Indicators
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3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Monetary Easing 
The European Central Bank has lowered interest rates four times since May 2001. The most 
recent reduction in early November took the main refinancing rate down to 3¼ per cent, 
bringing the cumulative reduction since May to 1½ percentage points. Given the benign 
inflationary outlook, the ECB has reacted to the marked slowdown in actual and expected 
growth in the Euro Area. 
Long-term interest rates have also decreased this year, although by less than short-term rates. 
The yield on 10-year government bonds is currently 4½ per cent, some 75 basis points below 
the level of one year ago, when the ECB last increased rates (see Chart 5). Consequently the 
yield spread between long-term and short-term interest rates, which had been very narrow for 
a while, has widened. Interest rates suggest that monetary conditions are expansionary at 
present, particularly if the past average level of real  rates in Germany is used as a benchmark 
indicator of neutral levels.1 However the euro has appreciated over the past 12 months both 
against the US-dollar (by 6 per cent) and in real effective terms (by 8 per cent). While we still 
judge the euro to be undervalued relative to its longer term equilibrium rate, the expansionary 
effects emanating from past devaluations have certainly diminished. 
At first glance the current rate of monetary growth would seem to indicate that monetary 
conditions are very expansionary. But this view cannot be sustained when taking a closer 
look. The annual growth rate of M3 of 7.6 per cent in September was distorted upwards 
because of the inclusion of non-resident holdings of money-market paper and short-term debt 
securities in M3. The steep increase – relative to the ECB’s reference value of 4.5 per cent for 
monetary growth – also reflects the past jump in prices and overstates the rise in liquidity 
because of portfolio shifts from longer-term to shorter-term assets.  
The continuous decline in the growth rate of credit to the private sector over recent months 
and the low growth of longer-term financial liabilities of the MFIs suggests that recent 
monetary growth does not signal the build-up of inflationary pressures. We have also argued 
previously that a liquidity overhang from past money growth does not exist because one-off 
events can account for monetary growth in excess of the reference value.2 
                                               
1 We feel this is necessary given the short time span in which the Euro Area has been in existence and 
differences in exchange rate depreciation expectations across member states in the past. Cf. Euroframe (2001): 
The Economic Situation of the European Union and the Outlook for 2001-2002 (ECON 126 EN-01/2001), 
p. 19. 
2 Cf. Euroframe (2001): The Economic Situation of the European Union and the Outlook for 2001-2002 (ECON 
126 EN - 01/2001), p. 21. 
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Overall, monetary conditions are presently expansionary. Given that recent rises in energy 
and food prices have not generated a price-wage spiral, with wage developments continuing 
to be moderate, we do not see any danger of a sustained rise in underlying inflation at the 
present time. Headline inflation is expected to decrease in the coming months. We expect that 
the European Central Bank will keep rates at the current level throughout next year. Clearly 
the ECB should act rapidly and cut rates once again if the Euro Area economy were to slow 
down more than we forecast or the euro were to appreciate by more than we anticipate.  
Chart 5: Interest rates in the Euro Area  January 1997 – October 2001 (% points) 
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Fiscal Balances  
Fiscal Deficits in Europe will rise significantly in 2001. The overall fiscal balance in the 
European Union was in surplus last year (1.2% of GDP including UMTS proceeds) and it is 
expected to swing into deficit this year by 0.7% of GDP. The surplus in 2001 was mainly 
acquired by revenue from sales of mobile transmission licenses in a number of countries. 
Without UMTS proceeds the European Union 15 were slightly in deficit last year by –0.1% 
of GDP. However, the relatively small underlying deficit was the partly result of strong 
growth creating high tax revenues and reducing expenditures on unemployment benefits and 
other social welfare programmes. The economic environment has changed a great deal since 
the start of the year, and is much worse than in 2000. Some of the beneficial impacts of 
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strong tax receipts from buoyant incomes and net profits will last throughout this year, 
because in particular corporate taxes are paid with a delay. There will however, be an overall 
shortfall of revenues and an unexpected increase of unemployment-related expenditures. On 
the other hand interest payments on government debt stocks should decrease at least slightly, 
given that the ECB has lowered short-term rates and long-term rates have also fallen to 
relatively low levels. We anticipate that deficits will rise this year by more than one 
percentage point of GDP. Given our projection of relatively weak growth, a further rise can 
be expected next year. Growth in the EU will very probably be below trend, and hence we 
would expect that automatic stabilisers will still induce reductions in revenue and increases in 
expenditures, and hence the accounts will show a larger deficit than they otherwise would. 
There are differences in the possibilities for fiscal policy in Europe. The UK government and 
many other, predominantly smaller, countries are running surpluses and are able to relax their 
fiscal policy stance without major difficulties. However, the larger countries of the Euro Area 
Germany, France and also Italy will probably violate restrictions set out in the Stability 
programmes agreed with the European Commission. Neither Germany nor France will reach 
their targets next year and Italy will have difficulties in doing so. The targets were set when 
output growth was expected to rise much more than now forecast for 2001 and 2002. These 
assumptions have turned to be far too optimistic. We expect output to rise only by 1.6 per 
cent this year and next in the Area. The current economic situation shows that it was 
unrealistic to set out last year to undertake three-year public finance programmes based on 
deficit reduction without taking account of the business cycle. These programmes should at 
best have set structural orientations for public receipts and expenditure in the medium-term. 
Consequently governments now face the difficult task of achieving the budgetary targets set 
out in the Stability programmes, without implementing pro-cyclical fiscal policies that would 
add to the deceleration of activity. The fundamental problem is that fiscal targets set out in 
order to achieve the objectives of the Stability Programme do not take account of the 
possibility of a serious cyclical setback. Therefore the present situation could create problems 
for the credibility of the consolidation process if governments do not behave in a way that can 
be seen as responding to current difficulties. There are two ways to avoid them. Governments 
could set up additional saving programmes, which might lead to an undesirable pro-cyclical 
stance of fiscal policy and thus increase the danger of a recession. In the current cyclical 
context, the alternative we prefer is to let automatic stabilisers operate fully and use structural 
deficits as targets since they are independent of the state of the business cycle.  
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This strategy would allow deficits to prevail as long as economic activity is slack. In 
particular it is possible that a pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance then can be avoided. This 
objective should be widely accepted by all major European economic policy institutions. In 
particular we would suggest that the ECB must not interpret the higher than planned deficits 
as posing a danger for price stability. If it were not to take our advice an overly restrictive 
monetary stance would offset, either in part or completely, any stabilising impact of fiscal 
policy. 
